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A Belief Propagation approach has been recently proposed for the zero-patient problem in a SIR
epidemics. The zero-patient problem consists in finding the initial source of an epidemic outbreak
given observations at a later time. In this work, we study a harder but related inference problem, in
which observations are noisy and there is confusion between observed states. In addition to studying
the zero-patient problem, we also tackle the problem of completing and correcting the observations
possibly finding undiscovered infected individuals and false test results.
Moreover, we devise a set of equations, based on the variational expression of the Bethe free
energy, to find the zero patient along with maximum-likelihood epidemic parameters. We show, by
means of simulated epidemics, how this method is able to infer details on the past history of an
epidemic outbreak based solely on the topology of the contact network and a single snapshot of
partial and noisy observations.
2I. INTRODUCTION
Epidemic compartment models provide a simple and useful mathematical description of the
mechanisms behind disease transmission between individuals, in which only the most prominent
ingredients are included [1]. One of the most celebrated of these models, Susceptible-Infected-
Recovered (SIR)[2], describes diseases in which the person contracting the disease becomes im-
mune to future infections after recovery, such as measles, rubella, chicken pox and generic in-
fluenza. The same model can be applied to lethal diseases, such as HIV or Ebola, provided that
the recovered state is replaced by a removed state. Being simple and mathematically appealing,
models such as SIR can be employed to study under which conditions and with which conse-
quences large epidemic outbreaks can occur. For most examples of infective diseases, contagion
runs over a network of effective contacts between individuals. These contact networks have been
inaccessible for decades, but thanks to recent advances in technology miniaturization (e.g. by
means of RFID-endowed badges to signal the proximity between individuals) and the populariza-
tion of the Internet (e.g. for the construction of databases of self-reported interactions), at least
in simple and controlled scenarios the interaction patterns of individual contacts can be almost
entirely reconstructed [3, 4]. Modern computational epidemiology can thus rely on accurate data
and on powerful computers to run large-scale simulations of stochastic compartment models on
real contact networks [5, 6].
In addition to epidemic forecast and control, a problem that has gained attention in recent
years is the one of reconstructing the history of an epidemic outbreak [7–18], as e.g. the path
of contagion to a specific infected individual. In particular, identifying the origin (or the set of
seeds or sources) of an epidemic outbreak in the general case is an open problem, even assuming
simple discrete-time stochastic epidemic models, such as the SI and SIR model. The reason
becomes clear when the inference is formulated as a maximum likelihood estimation problem.
Estimating the maximum of a properly defined likelihood function corresponds to solve a (gen-
erally non-convex) optimization problem in the space of all possible epidemic propagations that
are compatible with the data. For propagations with a unique source on regular trees, a max-
imum likelihood estimator was proposed by Shah and Zaman [7, 9] under the name of rumor
centrality (see also [13]) and extended to probabilistic observations in Ref. [17]. For a specific
continuous-time epidemic process, an optimal estimator on general trees was put forward by
Pinto et al. [11]. On general graphs, the number of propagation paths grows exponentially with
the number of nodes making the exact inference unfeasible in practice. Instead of evaluating the
likelihood function, Zhu and Ying put forward a method to select the path that most likely leads
to the observed snapshot [16]. For general graphs, other heuristic inference methods are based
on centrality measures [8, 10], on the distance between observed data and typical outcome of
propagations for given initial conditions [12] or on the assumption that the epidemic propagation
follows a breadth-first search tree [11, 15]. Even fewer results exist for epidemic inference with
multiple sources [15]. A message-passing approach for the computation of epidemic dynamics
was first introduced by Karrer and Newman [19] and applied to source detection in Ref. [14],
with a further mean-field approximation of the likelihood function.
Recently, a Belief Propagation (BP) approach was proposed for the Bayesian inference of the
origin of an epidemics [18]. The main idea is that of exploiting a graphical model representation of
the stochastic dynamics of the SI and SIR models to devise an efficient message-passing algorithm
for the evaluation of the posterior distribution of the epidemic sources. The BP approach is exact
on trees and it works very well also on general graphs, outperforming other methods on many
graph topologies, in the presence of one or more sources, and also when observations are by large
extent incomplete. In this work, we build on the BP approach by studying a harder variant
of the inference problem in which either (a) it is not possible to distinguish between recovered
or susceptible individuals or (b) the observation is noisy, i.e. there is a non-zero probability of
making an error in the observation of each individual. The first case was already described in Ref.
3[16] using the most likely infection path method on trees and similar heuristics on general graphs.
The second case was not directly faced in the literature, although the problem of determining
the causative network of epidemiological data in the presence of false negatives and positives
has recently attracted some attention [20, 21]. We will show that the BP approach allows for
more complete inference, as e.g. (a) to infer the epidemic parameters i.e. the probability of
transmission in each contact and the distribution of recovery times; and (b) to infer missing data
in a partial observation, e.g. correcting errors or finding which of the two states S, R in the
confused state setup.
The work is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a detailed description of the graphical
model representation of the stochastic epidemic dynamics. The BP equations of the model and
the details of their efficient implementation are discussed in Section 3 (plus Appendices). The
results of the Bayesian inference under different observation models are reported in Section 4.
In Section 5, we present an efficient on-line method for the inference of the epidemic parameters
by maximization of the log-likelihood by gradient ascent in the Bethe approximation.
II. GRAPHICAL MODEL REPRESENTATION OF THE EPIDEMIC PROCESS
We consider a discrete-time version of the susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) model [22] on a
graphG = (V,E) that represents the contact network of a set V of individuals. A node i can be in
one of three possible states: susceptible (S), infected (I), and recovered/removed (R). The state
of node i at time t is represented by a variable xti ∈ {S, I, R}. At each time step (e.g. a day) of the
stochastic dynamics, an infected node i can first spread the disease to each susceptible neighbor
j with given probability λij , then recover with probability µi. Once recovered, individuals do not
get sick anymore. This process is Markovian, and satisfies P (xt+1|xt) =
∏
i P (x
t+1
i |x
t) where
P (xt+1i = S|x
t) = I[xti = S]
∏
j∈∂i
(1− λjiI[x
t
j = I])
P (xt+1i = I|x
t) = (1 − µi)I[x
t
i = I] + I[x
t
i = S](1−
∏
j∈∂i
(1− λjiI[x
t
j = I]))
P (xt+1i = R|x
t) = µiI[x
t
i = I] + I[x
t
i = R].
A realization of the stochastic dynamics is fully specified by knowing for each individual i, her
infection time ti = min{t : x
t
i = I} and her recovery time gi = min{g : x
ti+g+1
i = R}. It is easy
to show that, for a given initial configuration {x0i }, a realization of the stochastic process can be
generated by drawing randomly the recovery time gi of each node i and an infection transmission
delay sij from node i to node j, for all pairs (ij). The recovery times {gi} are independent random
variables extracted from geometric distributions Gi (gi) = µi (1− µi)
gi , while the delays {sij} are
also independent random variables distributed according to a truncated geometric distribution,
ωij (sij |gi) =
{
λij (1− λij)
sij , sij ≤ gi∑
s>gi
λij (1− λij)
s
, sij =∞,
in which for convenience we concentrate in the value sij =∞ the mass of the distribution beyond
the hard cut-off gi imposed by the recovery time. Infection times are related by the deterministic
equation
ti = min
j∈∂i
(tj + sji) + 1 (1)
which is a constraint encoding the infection dynamics of the SIR model. Then individual i
recovers at time ti + gi.
4The exact mapping from realizations of the epidemic process to realizations of the transmis-
sion delays and recovery times can be exploited to provide a graphical model representation of
the stochastic dynamics of the SIR model on a graph. For a given initial condition, the joint
probability distribution of infection and recovery times conditioned on the initial state is
P
(
t,g|x0
)
=
∑
{sij}
P (s|g)P
(
t|x0,g, s
)
P (g)
=
∑
{sij}
∏
i,j
ωij (sij |gi)
∏
i
φi(ti, {tk, ski}k∈∂i)Gi(gi), (2)
where
φi(ti, {tk, ski}k∈∂i) = δ(ti,I[x
0
i 6= I](min
k∈∂i
(tk + ski) + 1)) (3)
is a characteristic function which imposes on each node i the dynamical constraint (1).
In the following we derive a method to reconstruct information about the origin of the epidemics
given some observation at later times. We first need to compute the posterior probability of
the initial configuration given an observation at time T . This is done by assuming to have a
probabilistic prior on the initially infected nodes and by applying Bayes formula,
P
(
x
0|xT
)
∝
∑
t,g
P
(
x
T |t,g
)
P
(
t,g|x0
)
P
(
x
0
)
=
∑
t,g,s
∏
i,j
ωij
∏
i
φiGiγiζi (4)
where P
(
x0
)
=
∏
i γi
(
x0i
)
is a factorized prior on the initial infection and where we exploited
the fact that the state xT is a deterministic function of the set of infection and recovery times
(t,g) given by
P
(
xT |t,g
)
=
∏
i
ζTi
(
ti, gi, x
T
i
)
(5)
with
ζti = I
[
xti = S, t < ti
]
+ I
[
xti = I, ti ≤ t < ti + gi
]
+ I
[
xti = R, ti + gi ≤ t
]
. (6)
The above formula can be generalized to the case in which the parameters µ and λ have
an explicit dependence on ti. The problem of computing the marginals from (4) is in general
intractable (NP-hard) and we need to resort to an efficient approximation. Here we choose to
implement the BP approximation which preserves some non trivial correlations between variables
and is exact in the limit cases in which correlation decay holds.
We proceed by introducing a factor graph representation of (4), namely a bipartite graph
composed of factor nodes and variable nodes. In the standard definition, each variable appearing
in the problem is identified by a variable node, while each factorized term of the probability weight
in (4) is represented by a factor node. A factor node is connected to the set of variable nodes
appearing in the corresponding factorized term. However, with this definition the factor graph of
(4) has a loopy structure both at local and global scale, and this could compromise the accuracy
of the BP approximation. The existence of short loops can be easily verified even focusing only
on the expression of the dynamical constraint (1): a pair of variable nodes corresponding to the
infection times ti and tj of neighboring individuals are indeed involved in the two factors φi and
φj , inducing a short loop in the factor graph (see Fig.1a). We would like to use a factor graph
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Figure 1. (a) Example of a loopy factor graph representations induced by constraints such as those in
(1). (b) Disentangled factor graph. (c) A more convenient representation of the disentangled factor
graph employed in the present work. For simplicity, the dependency on {sij} is not considered.
representation that maintains the same topological properties of the original graph of contacts,
in order to guarantee that BP is exact when the original graph of contacts is a tree. Following
an approach proposed in [23, 24], the factor graph can be disentangled by grouping pairs of
infection times (ti, tj) in the same variable node as in Fig.1b. For convenience, we will keep all
variable nodes {ti} but we will also introduce for each edge (i, j) emerging from a node i a set of
copies t
(j)
i of the infection time ti, that will be forced to take the common value ti (see Fig.1c)
by including the constraint
∏
k∈∂i δ(t
(k)
i , ti) in the factor φi.
We also observe that the factors φi depend on infection times and transmission delays just
through the sums t
(j)
i + sij . It is thus more convenient to introduce the variables tij = t
(j)
i + sij
and express the dependencies through the pairs (t
(j)
i , tij).
Finally it is convenient to group the variable gi with the corresponding infection times ti in
the same variable node, replace gi and gj by their copies g
(j)
i and g
(i)
j in the edge constraints
ωij(tij − t
(j)
i |g
(i)
i ) and ωji(tji − tj |g
(i)
j ) and impose the identity
∏
k∈∂i δ(g
(k)
i , gi) for each node i.
We can now define the new factors
φij = ωij(tij − t
(j)
i |g
(i)
i )ωji(tji − t
(i)
j |g
(i)
j ) (7)
and
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Figure 2. Factor graph representation of the graphical model associated with the distribution (10).
ψi = δ(ti, I[x
0
i 6= I](min
j∈∂i
(tji + 1)))
∏
j∈∂i
δ(t
(j)
i , ti)δ(g
(j)
i , gi)
= φi(ti, {tji}j∈∂i)
∏
j∈∂i
δ(t
(j)
i , ti)δ(g
(j)
i , gi). (8)
The posterior distribution can be written as
P
(
x0|xT
)
∝
∑
t,{tij},g
Q(g, t, {tij}, x0) (9)
where
Q(g, t, {tij}, x0) =
1
Z
∏
i<j
φij
∏
i
ψiGiγiζi. (10)
Figure 2 shows the factor graph representation of the distribution (10). The factor node
grouping ξi, ζi and Gi has in fact a more complex structure that is described in detail in Fig.3a:
the function ζti , defined in (6), connects the infection time ti with the state x
t
i of the node at
time t, γi is the prior on the initial state, while Gi(gi) is the recovery time distribution. Having
built a factor graph with the same topology of the original graph, we can now compute the
exact posterior marginals for the SIR model with BP in the case of tree graphs and obtain a
good approximation of it even on graphs that are not trees if the correlation decay assumption
is correct.
III. BP EQUATIONS
Belief propagation consists in a set of equations for single-site probability distributions labeled
by directed graph edges. These equations are solved by iteration, and on a fixed point give an
approximation for single-site marginals and other quantities of interest like the partition function
Z.
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Figure 3. (a) Detailed description of the internal structure of the factor node containing γi, ζi, Gi in
Fig.2. (b) The modified factor graph used to include the observation models discussed in Section IV.
We recall the general form of the BP equations in the following. For a factorized probability
measure on z = {zi},
M(z) =
1
Z
∏
a
Fa(za) (11)
where za is the subvector of variables that Fa depends on, the general form of the equations is
pFa→i (zi) =
1
Zai
∑
{zj:j∈∂a\i}
Fa
(
{zi}i∈∂a
) ∏
j∈∂a\i
mj→Fa (zj) (12)
mi→Fa (zi) =
1
Zia
∏
b∈∂i\a
pFb→i (zi) (13)
mi (zi) =
1
Zi
∏
b∈∂i
pFb→i (zi) (14)
where Fa is a factor (i.e. ψi, φij , γi, ζ
0
i , ζ
T
i or Gi in our case), zi is a variable (i.e. (ti, gi),
(t
(j)
i , g
(j)
i , tji), x
0
i or x
T
i in our case), ∂a is the subset of indices of variables in factor Fa and ∂i is
the subset of factors that depend on zi. The terms Zia, Zai and Zi are normalization factors that
can be calculated once the rest of the right-hand side is computed. While equations (13)-(14)
can be always computed efficiently in general, the computation of the trace in (12) may need a
time which is exponential in the number of participating variables. The update equations (12)
for factors φij , γi, ζ
0
i , ζ
T
i and Gi can be computed in a straightforward way because they involve
a very small (constant) number of variables each. In Appendix A we show the derivation of an
efficient version of equation (12) for factor ψi that can be computed in linear time in the degree
of vertex i, and we provide a change of variables that simplifies the messages and further reduces
the computation time of the update.
8IV. OBSERVATION MODELS
In the inference of the origin of epidemic propagations it is often assumed that the state of
every node is known at the observation time T with no uncertainty. This is also the case studied
in Ref.[18], where the BP approach for this problem was first introduced. In practice, every
clinical test for determining the state of an individual is affected by some amount of error, and
this possibility has to be taken into account in the inference problem. Therefore, it is realistic
to assume that each observation carries some level of noise. We introduce a general concept of
observation model for the inference problem, that allows dealing with several different cases of
incomplete and noisy data using a common notation. We will assume that the noise level is known
(as it is the case for the majority of clinical tests), and introduce a new variable yTi ∈ {S, I, R}
for the observed state of node i and an additional evidence term that reflects the probability
ni
(
yTi |x
T
i
)
of the observed state yTi given the true state x
T
i . In the factor graph, the observed-
state variables yTi are fixed to their value given by the experimental observation (by means of
a delta function representing an infinite external field), while the true-state variables xTi are
traced over in the compatibility function ζTi . More explicitly, the modified factor graph shown in
Fig. 3b, contains a ζTi factor node attached to the true-state variable x
T
i , which is linked to the
observed state yTi (which is a constant) through the node ni
(
yTi |x
T
i
)
. The posterior distribution
now takes the form:
P
(
x
0|yT
)
∝
∑
xT ,t,tij ,g
Q′(xT ,g, t, tij , x0) (15)
where
Q′(xT ,g, t, tij , x0) =
1
Z
∏
i<j
φij
∏
i
ψiGiγiζini. (16)
In what follows, we introduce for convenience a map ρ(s) from indices i ∈ {1, 2, 3} into con-
figurations of the x variables, such that ρ(1) = S, ρ(2) = I, ρ(3) = R, and then define the
observational transition matrix (OTM ) O
(i)
s,t whose elements are the transition probabilities:
O
(i)
s,t = ni (ρ(s), ρ(t)) . (17)
The case in which observations are complete and noiseless corresponds to an identity matrix
O
(i)
s,t = δst. In the following sections, we will cover some interesting examples of applications
of this scheme to confused and noisy observations. Note that, in this generalized scheme, we
can also take into account the case of partial observations, by assuming a totally uniform OTM
O
(i)
s,t ≡
1
3 for unobserved nodes.
A. Inference of epidemic source from confused observations
In some situations, it could be hard to distinguish between nodes that already recovered from
a disease and nodes that did not contract it at all. To take into account this fact, we follow
the approach of Ref.[16] and explore the efficiency of our inference machinery in a setting in
which observations on Susceptible and Recovered nodes are confused. More specifically, we allow
only two types of observed states xTi ∈ {I,N}, where N stands for Not-Infected. This situation
corresponds to choose the following OTM :
9O(i) =

 12 0 120 1 0
1
2 0
1
2

 .
We verified the performances of the BP algorithm on a completely uniform setting provided
by random regular graphs with identical infection parameters (λ, µ) for all nodes and links. All
epidemic propagations were initiated from a unique seed (the zero patient). For each node, the
BP algorithm provides an estimate of the posterior probability that the node got infected at a
certain time, and thus also the probability that the node was the origin of the epidemics. We
can thus rank the nodes in decreasing order with respect of the estimated probability of being
the origin of the observed epidemics: the position of the true origin in the ranking provided by
the algorithm is a good measure of the efficacy of the method. In what follows, we indicate with
i0 the ranking of the true origin of the epidemics, and with |G| the number of nodes in the graph
G.
An important by-product of the algorithm is the ability to infer the true state of a node from
the marginal of the infection time, providing in this way a method to “correct” observations.
More precisely, in the present example we consider the problem of discriminating between Sus-
ceptible and Recovered nodes. An effective method for quantifying the accuracy of such binary
classification problem is the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC ) curve, namely a plot of
the “true positive rate" against the “false positive rate". Constructing the ROC curve in the
present case is very easy: we select the N nodes and rank them on the base of their marginal
P
(
ti =∞|x
0
)
, we then take one step upward in the ROC whenever a true positive case is en-
countered (yTi = x
T
i = S) or one step rightward in case of a false positive (y
T
i 6= x
T
i ). We
performed this discrimination analysis for each sample and then computed the average value of
the area under the ROC curve, that gives indication of the fraction of correctly classified nodes.
It turns out that the proposed algorithm can be effectively used as an ex-post-facto tool for
discriminating Susceptible against Recovered individuals.
Figure 4 displays the average rank of the true infected site i0, normalized to the network size
|G|, for a set of M = 1000 simulated epidemic propagations with λ = 0.6 and µ = 1 on random
regular graphs of size N = 1000 and degree d = 4 (T = 10). The quantities of interest are plot as
functions of the normalized epidemic size NIR =
|I|+|R|
|G| (i.e. the fraction of infected or recovered
sites), whose values are discretized with intervals of width equal to 0.05. Note that in all the
figures we show in the paper, we discarded the rare cases with very low epidemic size (NIR < 0.3
in Fig. 5, NIR < 0.2 elsewhere) where the number of infected is extremely low and the inference
is practically unfeasible.
For each set of data, the symbols report the mean value obtained averaging over the samples
belonging to that interval and the error bars indicate the corresponding standard deviation.
The average fraction of Infected nodes and the fraction of samples in each bin are reported as
a reference. The normalized average rank of the true origin is very low for all values of the
normalized epidemic size, meaning that the algorithm is very effective in identifying the zero-
patient. We also show the average ROC area, which reveals that the inference algorithm allows
a very good discrimination between S and R nodes.
The same analysis for a random graph with power-law degree distribution, obtained using the
Barabasi-Albert model [25], is reported in Fig.5. When the observation time T is sufficiently
small (T = 7 in Fig.5), the performance of the algorithm is high. When longer observation times
are considered, epidemics tend to cover the whole network and convergence issues emerge. In
this regime, most of the infected nodes have already recovered at the observation time T (and
thus they cannot be distinguished anymore from the susceptible ones). This causes a rapid decay
of the available information content that explains the performance degradation. A similar effect
arises also on random regular graphs, but at longer times, as we will see in Section IVB.
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Figure 4. Average normalized rank of the true zero-patient (blue solid line), average ROC area (red
dashed line) and average fraction of Infected nodes |I|
|G|
(green dotted line) as a function of the rescaled
epidemic size |I|+|R|
|G|
. The fraction of the M samples belonging to each bin of the rescaled epidemic size
is also indicated. The realization of the epidemic process is propagated for T = 10 steps with λ = 0.6
and µ = 1. Observations are confused, i.e. xti ∈ {I,N}. Simulations were run over M = 1000 samples
of random regular graphs with N = 1000 nodes and degree d = 4.
In summary, even when supplied with confused observations, BP shows striking ability to
discriminate between Recovered and Susceptible nodes, provided that there is enough information
at the chosen observation time T .
B. Inference of the epidemic source with noisy observations
Let us now consider a simple type of observational noise. Suppose that a node on state x,
has probability 1− ν of being correctly observed in state x, and probability ν of being observed
incorrectly in one of the two remaining states, distributed uniformly among the two. For example,
node i could be I (Infected) at the observation time T , and, for a given noise level ν, there will
be an equal probability ν2 for node i to be observed in the R (Recovered) or S (Susceptible)
state. This setting corresponds to the following OTM :
O(i) =

 1− ν ν2 ν2ν
2 1− ν
ν
2
ν
2
ν
2 1− ν

 .
We simulated a set of M = 1000 single-source epidemic propagations with λ = 0.6 and µ = 1
on random regular graphs with N = 1000 nodes and degree d = 4. In Fig. 6 we show the
average rank of the true origin of the epidemics for various levels of the observational noise up
to ν = 0.4. The low values of the average rank obtained demonstrate that the BP algorithm is
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Figure 5. Average normalized rank of the true zero patient (blue solid line), average ROC area (red
dashed line) and average fraction of Infected nodes |I|
|G|
(green dotted line) as a function of the rescaled
epidemic size |I|+|R|
|G|
. The fraction of the M samples belonging to each bin of the rescaled epidemic size
is also indicated. The realization of the epidemic process is propagated up to the time step T = 7 with
λ = 0.6 and µ = 0.5. Observations are confused, i.e. xti ∈ {I,N}. Simulations were run over M = 1000
samples of Barabasi-Albert graphs with N = 1000 nodes and average degree dˆ = 4.
able to perform extremely well up to very high levels of noise. The corresponding ROC curves
are plotted in Fig. 7.
We investigated the role of observation time T in relation to the amount of information needed
for inferring the zero patient: simulations were run for given realizations of the epidemic process
and observation time was systematically varied. In Fig. 8 we show a representative situation in
random graphs (the picture is similar in scale-free graphs, as we argued in SectionIVA). It turns
out that the ratio of infected nodes to epidemic size is critical for inference: when observation
time is too long so that the majority of infected individuals have recovered, it is much more
difficult to find the zero-patient in the noisy and confused case. As it can be seen in the figure,
this sharp change of behaviour (manifested at T = 11) is present even in single instances.
V. INFERENCE OF EPIDEMIC PARAMETERS
We have shown that if the parameters of the epidemics are known in advance, our inference
method can effectively detect the zero patient. It is reasonable to assume that, for certain types of
diseases, clinical information could dictate some plausible range for the average rates of infection
and recovery. In the simplified case in which the infection parameters are uniform among the
population, the BP method can be generalized in a way to infer both the zero patient and the
epidemic parameters at the same time.
From our bayesian approach, −f(λ, µ) = logZ(λ, µ) is the log-likelihood of the epidemic
parameters for the observation xT . Indeed, the log–likelihood of the parameters −f(λ, µ) equals
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Figure 6. Average normalized rank of the true zero patient as a function of epidemic size |I|+|R|
|G|
for
various levels of noise ν in the observation (the error-bars indicate the standard deviation computed
on the sub-sample corresponding to a given epidemic size). Each curve refers to M = 1000 samples of
Random Regular graphs with N = 1000 nodes and degree d = 4. Epidemics is propagated until T = 10
with λ = 0.6 and µ = 1.
logP
(
xT |λ, µ
)
and the latter can be computed as
P
(
xT |λ, µ
)
=
∑
t,g,x0
P
(
xT |t,g
)
P
(
t,g|x0
)
P
(
x0
)
= Z (λ, µ) . (18)
In Ref. [18], this observation was used to infer the epidemic parameters through an exaustive
search in the space of parameters. This computation can be costly, wasting resources on non-
interesting regions of the parameter space. Moreover, this type of experiments shows that the
log-likelihood landscape with the Bethe approximation is generally very simple, presenting in
most cases a single local maximum. Here we describe a different method to infer the parameters
together with the source of the epidemic outbreak. The idea is to perform an on-line log-likelihood
maximization through gradient ascent in the Bethe approximation of the log-likelihood, by means
of the following updates:
λ← λ+ ǫ
∂f
∂λ
(19)
µ← µ+ ǫ
∂f
∂µ
(20)
with ǫ a free convergence parameter. The free energy of the system can be approximated with
the Bethe free energy, which in turn can be expressed as a sum of local terms depending on
BP messages. A detailed derivation of the expression of the derivatives ∂f
∂λ
and ∂f
∂µ
of the Bethe
free energy is reported in Appendix B. In principle, the expressions obtained using the Bethe
free energy are valid only at the BP fixed point, and one should let BP updates converge before
making a step of gradient ascent. In practice, we found that it is sufficient to interleave BP and
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Figure 7. Average area of the ROC curve as a function of epidemic size |I|+|R|
|G|
for various levels of
noise ν in the observation (the error-bars indicate the standard deviation computed on the sub-sample
corresponding to a given epidemic size). Each curve refers to M = 1000 samples of Random Regular
graphs with N = 1000 nodes and degree d = 4. Epidemics is propagated until T = 10 with λ = 0.6 and
µ = 1.
gradient ascent updates in order to obtain equivalent results. A fixed point of the interleaved
updates is both a critical point of the Bethe log-likelihood and a BP approximation for the
marginals. We performed extensive simulations with a wide range of parameters and found that,
for reasonable fraction of infected nodes at the observation time, the inference can simultaneously
identify the zero patient perfectly and find good estimates of the epidemic parameters. Some
examples of inferred parameters are shown in Fig. 9 for six different configurations of (λ, µ)
parameters, with each pair of box plots referring to M = 1000 samples.
The method can be extended to treat the non-uniform case, at the expense of a higher com-
putational effort, that would amount in computing local derivatives of the free-energy function
for each edge in the graph with respect to edge-specific parameter. It should be clear that the
number of parameters in the non-uniform case should not grow excessively for inference pur-
poses: we could, nevertheless, account for age or gender-dependent differences in the probability
to contract the disease or in the recovery rate with the introduction of additional information,
attached to nodes and edges in the network. Notice that, even in this case, an exhaustive search
in the parameter space could be computationally too expensive.
The inference of parameters can be performed also in the presence of observational noise. In
Fig. 10 we show an example of inference for increasing levels of noise in the observation, as
defined in the preceeding section. Also in this case the zero patient is detected with probability
1 and the inferred parameters are good estimators of the true values even up to a significant
fraction of noise.
We compared the ability of BP to infer the epidemic parameters with a simpler (though com-
putationally expensive) procedure that does not require (nor provide) the simultaneous inference
of the origin. The idea is to compare the statistical properties of the observation with the
one of typical epidemics with given parameters λ, µ, and choose those λ, µ that give proper-
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Figure 8. Normalized rank of the true zero-patient (solid lines), fraction of Infected nodes |I|
|G|
(green
dotted line) and rescaled epidemic size |I|+|R|
|G|
(dotted purple line) as a function of observation time
T for a single realization of the epidemic process, propagated with λ = 0.6 and µ = 1, on a random
regular graph with N = 1000 nodes and degree d = 4. Observations are complete (black solid line,
superimposed to x axes), confused (blue solid line), and with noise 20% noise level (red solid line).
Values of the normalized rank greater than 0.5 are meaningless: they are the realization of a random
variable with average close to 0.5, and they are evidence that for large T the inference algorithm is
unable to identify the zero-patient with better precision than pure chance.
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Figure 9. Inferred epidemic parameters for six different configurations of true (λ, µ) parameters. Forward
epidemic is simulated until observation time T = 10. Each pair of boxes refers to M = 1000 instances
of Random Regular graphs with N = 1000 nodes and degree g = 4. Box edges signal the 25th and
75th percentiles, the central red lines is the median. Whiskers extend to cover 99.3% of the data for a
gaussian distribution. Outliers are marked as red points outside the whiskers.
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Figure 10. Inferred epidemic parameters for different observational noise rates ν. Forward epidemic is
simulated until observation time T = 10. Each box refers to M = 1000 instances of Random Regular
graphs with N = 1000 nodes and degree g = 4. Box edges signal the 25th and 75th percentiles, the
central red lines is the median. Whiskers extend up to cover 99.3% of the data for a gaussian distribution.
Outliers are marked as red points outside the whiskers.
ties that are closest (in a sense to be defined) to the ones observed. More precisely, for each
λ ∈ {0.05, 0.1, . . . , 0.95} and µ ∈ {0, 0.05, . . . , 1}, we generate 1000 random epidemics and com-
pute the mean of the number of infected Imean(λ, µ) and recovered Rmean(λ, µ) individuals.
Afterwards, given an observation with I infected and R recovered individuals, we find
(λ∗, µ∗) = argmin
λ,µ
(I − Imean(λ, µ))
2 + (R−Rmean(λ, µ))
2.
We also repeated the procedure using the median instead of the mean (and computing thus
Imedian and Rmedian). In Fig. 11 we show the distributions of λ
∗ and µ∗ found by the above
procedure based on 200 epidemic realizations with λ = 0.6 and µ = 0.5, along by the same
distribution as found by the interleaved BP gradient ascent of the likelihood function. The
results show that the BP-based procedure is able to infer the correct parameter λ = 0.6 and
µ = 0.5 with much higher accuracy.
VI. CONCLUSION
BP was recently proposed as an efficient tool for the inference of the origins of an epidemic
propagation on graphs from a snapshot of the system at a later time. In the present work, we
generalized the analysis to more realistic cases in which observations are imperfect. Experimental
results show that BP performs well even in the presence of strong sources of uncertainty, such
as observational noise, inability to distinguish between observed states, and uncertainty on the
intrinsic model parameter. We provided an exact solution on acyclic graphs for the first two
problems, and a variational solution to compute the gradient of the likelihood of the parameters.
The latter can be employed to find local maxima of the likelihood function. We also characterized,
by means of simulations, the amount of information that can be extracted on random graphs of
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Figure 11. Comparison of inference of epidemic parameters for 200 random realizations with λ = 0.6,
µ = 0.5 between BP and the naive method consisting in finding the couple (λ∗, µ∗) which is closest in
terms of mean (resp. median) number of infected and recovered individuals in euclidean distance. The
distributions for the inference with BP correspond to the fifth example reported in Fig.9 and the first in
Fig.10.
various types, both on the past origin of the epidemics and on the missing bits on the present-
time observation. Besides giving an excellent algorithmic answer to these questions, related
to the past and the present of an observed epidemics, the scheme can be easily generalized to
give accurate predictions about the future evolution of an outbreak from which only a partial
observation (noisy and/or incomplete) of the current state is available. Work is in progress in
this direction.
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Appendix A: Efficient BP updates
An efficient form for the update equations of the ψi factor nodes is the following:
pψi→j
(
t
(j)
i , tji, g
(j)
i
)
∝
∑
gi,ti
∑
{
t
(k)
i
,tki,g
(k)
i
}
mi→ψi (ti, gi)× (A1)
×
∏
k∈∂i\j
mk→ψi
(
t
(k)
i , tki, g
(k)
i
)
ψi
(
ti, gi,
{(
t
(k)
i , tki, g
(k)
i
)}
k∈∂i
)
∝ mi→ψi
(
t
(j)
i , g
(j)
i
)∑
tki
∏
k∈∂i\j
mk→ψi
(
t
(j)
i , tki, g
(j)
i
)
× (A2)
×
[
δ
(
t
(j)
i , 0
)
+ δ
(
t
(j)
i ,
(
1 + min
k∈∂i
{tki}
))]
∝ δ
(
t
(j)
i , 0
)
mi→ψi
(
0, g
(j)
i
) ∏
k∈∂i\j
∑
tki
mk→ψi
(
0, tki, g
(j)
i
)
+ (A3)
+ mi→ψi
(
t
(j)
i , g
(j)
i
)
I
(
t
(j)
i ≤ tji + 1
) ∏
k∈∂i\j
∑
tki≥t
(j)
i
−1
mk→ψi
(
t
(j)
i , tki, g
(j)
i
)
− mi→ψi
(
t
(j)
i , g
(j)
i
)
I
(
t
(j)
i < tji + 1
) ∏
k∈∂i\j
∑
tki>t
(j)
i
−1
mk→ψi
(
t
(j)
i , tki, g
(j)
i
)
where in (A3) we use the fact that
δ
(
ti,
(
1 + min
j∈∂i
{tji}
))
=
∏
j∈∂i
I (ti ≤ tji + 1)−
∏
j∈∂i
I (ti < tji + 1) .
It is also possibile to use a simpler representation for the messages, in which we just retain
information on the relative timing of infection time t
(j)
i for a node i and infection propagation
time tji on its link with node j, introducing the variables σji = 1 + sign
(
tji −
(
t
(j)
i − 1
))
.
In equation (A3) we can easily group the sums over different configurations of
(
tki, t
(j)
i
)
and
write:
pψi→j
(
t
(j)
i , σji, g
(j)
i
)
∝ δ
(
t
(j)
i , 0
)
mi→ψi
(
0, g
(j)
i
) ∏
k∈∂i\j
∑
σ
′(k)
i
mk→ψi
(
0, σki, g
(j)
i
)
+ (A4)
+ mi→ψi
(
t
(j)
i , g
(j)
i
)
I (σji = 1, 2)
∏
k∈∂i\j
∑
σki=1,2
mk→ψi
(
t
(j)
i , σki, g
(j)
i
)
− mi→ψi
(
t
(j)
i , g
(j)
i
)
I (σji = 2)
∏
k∈∂i\j
mk→ψi
(
t
(j)
i , 2, g
(j)
i
)
Similarly, the outgoing message to the i variable node is:
pψi→i (ti, gi) ∝ δ (ti, 0)
∏
k∈∂i
∑
σki
mk→ψi (0, σki, gi) + (A5)
+
∏
k∈∂i
∑
σki=1,2
mk→ψi (ti, σki, gi)
−
∏
k∈∂i
mk→ψi (ti, 2, gi)
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In the simplified (t, σ, g) representation for the messages, the update equation for the φij nodes
can be written in an easy way:
pφij→j (tj , σij , gj) ∝
∑
ti,σji,gi
Ω (ti, tj , σij , σji, gi, gj) pi→φij (ti, σji, gi) (A6)
where:
Ω (ti, tj, σij , σji, gi, gj) =


χ (ti, tj , σij , gi) : ti < tj , σji = 2, σij 6= 2
χ (ti, tj , σij , gi) + (1− λ)
gi+1 : ti < tj , σji = 2, σji = 2
χ (tj , ti, σji, gj) : tj < ti, σji = 2, σji 6= 2
χ (tj , ti, σji, gj) + (1− λ)
gj+1 : tj < ti, σij = 2, σji = 2
1 : ti = tj , σji = σij = 2
0 : otherwise
(A7)
and
χ (t1, t2, σ, g) =
t1+g∑
t=t1
δ (σ (t2, t) , σ) λ (1− λ)
t−t1 (A8)
Note that it is possible to exploit the symmetry in i and j between the rows 1-2 and rows 3-4
in the definition (A7) for Ω: when one loops over the variables (tj , σij , gj) in order to fill in
the output message pφij→j (tj , σij , gj), this consists in looping over the variables (tj , σij , gj) of
the input message pi→φij (ti, σi, gi), just with a switch in indices. In the implementation, this
amounts in a significant reduction of a factor G in the computational complexity for updates
involving the factor node φij .
Appendix B: Gradient ascent method for the inference of the epidemic parameters
The free energy of the system can be approximated with the Bethe free energy that can be
expressed as a sum of local terms depending on the BP messages.
−f =
∑
a
fa +
∑
i
fi −
∑
(ia)
f(ia) (B1)
where
fa = log

 ∑
{zi:i∈∂a}
Fa
(
{zi}i∈∂a
) ∏
i∈∂a
mi→a(zi)

 (B2)
f(ia) = log
(∑
zi
mi→a(zi)pFa→i(zi)
)
(B3)
fi = log
(∑
zi
∏
b∈∂i
pFb→i(zi)
)
(B4)
The computation of the gradient of the free energy deserves some special attention: being f
a function of all the BP messages, one would argue that this messages depend on the model
parameters too, at every step in the BP algorithm. Actually, there is no need to consider
this implicit (λ, µ) dependence if BP has reached its fixed point, that is when BP equations
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are satisfied and the messages are nothing else but Lagrange multipliers with respect to the
constraint minimization of the Bethe free energy functional [26]. In our scheme, the only explicit
dependence of free energy on epidemic parameters is in the factor node terms fa’s involving
compatibility functions φij = ωij (tij − ti|gi)ωji (tji − tj |gj) and Gi (gi) = µi (1− µi)
gi , and the
gradient can be computed very easily. For the φij nodes we have:
∂fφij
∂λ
=
∑
ti,tji,gi,tj ,tij ,gj
∂φij
∂λ
(ti, tji, gi, tj, tij , gj)mi→φij (ti, tji, gi)mj→φij (tj , tij , gj)∑
ti,tji,gi,tj ,tij ,gj
φij (ti, tji, gi, tj, tij , gj)mi→φij (ti, tji, gi)mj→φij (tj , tij , gj)
(B5)
where
∂φij
∂λ
=


1 ti < tj and ti = tij < ti + gi
− (gi − ti)λ (1− λ)
gi−ti−1 ti < tj and ti < tij = ti + gi
(1− λ)
tij−ti − (tij − ti) λ (1− λ)
tij−ti−1 ti < tj and ti < tij < ti + gi
1 tj < ti and tj = tj < tj + gj
− (gj − tj)λ (1− λ)
gj−tj−1 tj < ti and tj < tji = tj + gj
(1− λ)
tji−tj − (tji − tj) λ (1− λ)
tji−tj−1 tj < ti and tj < tji < tj + gj
0 else
(B6)
In the simplified (t, σ, g) representation for the messages, equation (B6) takes the form:
∂φij
∂λ
=


χ (ti, tj , σij , gi) ti < tj , σji = 2, σij 6= 2
χ (ti, tj , σij , gi)− (gi + 1) (1− λ)
gi ti < tj , σji = 2, σij = 2
χ (tj , ti, σji, gj) tj < ti, σji = 2, σij 6= 2
χ (tj , ti, σji, gj)− (gj + 1) (1− λ)
gj tj < ti, σji = 2, σij = 2
0 otherwise
(B7)
where:
χ (t1, t2, σ, g) =
t1+g∑
t=t1
δ (σ (t2, t) , σ) (1− λ)
t−t1 − (t− t1)λ (1− λ)
t−t1−1 (B8)
For the Gi nodes we have:
∂fGi
∂µ
=
∑
gi
G˜i(gi)mi→Gi (gi)∑
gi
Gi(gi)mi→Gi (gi)
(B9)
where
G˜i(gi) =
{
(1− µ)gi − giµ (1− µ)
gi−1 : gi < G
G−G (1− µ)G−1 : gi = G.
(B10)
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